Staying Alive (Or: On Becoming
Staying Alive (Or: On Becoming the Emperor of China)
Dana Parker sends us to Julian Baggini’s Staying Alive: The Personal Identity Game that presents three scenarios having to do with what constitutes self-identity. For example, in the first one, you have to decide whether you’d rather get to Mars by taking a risky space ship or via a teleporter that maps your atoms and rebuilds you on Mars. The entire game takes about five minutes to play, and it’s fascinating. Then you can read a brief and clear analysis of your results. (The site is presented by The Philosopher’s Magazine, which looks like an interesting compendium of ideas.)
It reminds of a thought experiment I used to present to students. (I don’t remember where I read it.) Suppose a genie tells you that you can become the emperor of China, with all the luxury and riches you could ever want, just by drinking a potion. You think this would be great and you’re all set to do it when the genie says, “Oh, there’s just one small catch. When you drink this potion, you’ll fall asleep and a few hours later you’ll wake up as the emperor … but you’ll have no memory of ever having been you.” Most students say they would drink the potion anyway. But then, demonstrating how much smarter you are than your poor little students, you ask: “Ok, then tell me the difference between (1) waking up as the emperor of China with no recollection of who you are today and (2) you dying and someone else very much like you becoming emperor.”
This, by the way, is also a pretty good argument against reincarnation. Reincarnation without memory is indistinguishable from death. Having a soul that gets recycled without memory is as satisfying as having a body that gets recycled.
Categories: Uncategorized dw
Er no, that isn’t a good argument against reincarnation at all. In fact it totally fails. You’re using psychological continuity — in particular memories — to define personal identity. However people who subscribe to the reincarnation hypothesis do not use pschological continuity to define personal identity, rather they employ the concept of a substantial self/soul.
In other words you are completely begging the question. Just as skeptics/materialists always do.